Nearly four years after Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 to end a devastating two-year war, the region finds itself in a state of resurfacing tensions. While the large-scale conflict has ceased, many of the political, territorial, and security disputes that initially fueled the war remain unresolved, creating an environment for the TPLF to reposition itself.

The Pretoria Agreement mandated a permanent cessation of hostilities, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of Tigrayan forces, alongside political dialogue and the return of displaced populations. Crucially, Article 7 of the deal required the TPLF to cease conscription, training, deployment, and mobilisation of military forces, and to halt preparations for renewed conflict. However, developments since 2024 suggest that the TPLF has maintained significant organisational and security influence, contrary to the agreement's intent.

Recent events indicate a strategic re-emergence of the TPLF. This includes reported high-level contacts with Eritrean officials, including meetings in Dubai and Zalambessa. Concurrently, a renewed struggle for political control within Tigray has emerged, alongside reports of ongoing recruitment and mobilisation efforts. These activities, if confirmed, would directly challenge the disarmament provisions and the ban on military mobilisation outlined in the peace accord.

The implications of these developments are significant, raising questions about the long-term stability of the peace process. The period since the Pretoria Agreement may have served less as a definitive transition to peace and more as a tactical pause, allowing the TPLF to regroup and strengthen its position while underlying conflict drivers persist.

Article 6 of the Pretoria Agreement outlined a process for disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating TPLF fighters. While Tigrayan forces did surrender heavy weaponry and thousands of former combatants entered demobilisation programmes, the regional military structures were not fully dismantled. The emergence of reports in 2026 detailing renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray suggests a potential violation of Article 7, which explicitly prohibits conscription and mobilisation.

It is important to distinguish between organised military mobilisation and the broader sentiments of Tigray's civilian population. There is no indication that the Tigrayan people as a whole support a return to warfare; many continue to grapple with the severe consequences of the previous conflict. The current developments point towards a strategic repositioning by the TPLF rather than a widespread popular desire for renewed hostilities.

Beyond internal regrouping, the TPLF has also been involved in fostering new strategic relationships. The emergence of Tsimdo, a loose coalition of groups opposing the federal government, further illustrates the TPLF's efforts to build alliances and expand its political and military leverage. These external connections add another layer of complexity to the regional security landscape.

As tensions resurface, several questions remain unanswered regarding the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and the future trajectory of peace in Tigray. The extent to which the TPLF has truly adhered to its commitments, particularly concerning disarmament and the cessation of military mobilisation, will be crucial in determining the region's path forward. The international community will likely be closely monitoring these developments as they unfold.