Sudan's army has achieved significant battlefield successes this summer, recapturing key towns and pushing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) onto the defensive across much of the country. These gains have emboldened Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leaders to speak of a potential total defeat of the RSF, rather than merely containing the conflict.

However, a closer examination of the eastern front and recent RSF actions reveals a more complex reality. In mid-August, the RSF, allied with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu, recaptured strategic locations in Blue Nile state, reportedly launching attacks from across the Ethiopian border. Concurrently, drone attacks on army-controlled cities highlight the RSF's enduring reach beyond its traditional strongholds in Darfur.

This mixed battlefield picture suggests that military victory for the SAF may not translate into a broader political resolution. Analysts warn that even a complete defeat of the RSF could lead to the fragmentation of Sudan's war into multiple, smaller-scale conflicts, rather than its conclusion. The dynamics of the anti-RSF coalition are central to this concern.

The SAF leads a coalition that includes allied armed movements, such as Darfuri factions that were signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). Prominent among these are Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement, headed by Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi. These groups, while aligned against the RSF, have been hesitant to fully integrate their forces into national military structures.

This reluctance stems from a desire to maintain military autonomy, which underpins their political leverage. The JPA mandated the integration of these forces into Sudan's military and security services, but progress has been slow. Promises made by SAF leadership, including Yasser al-Atta in March to activate integration mechanisms, have yet to yield substantial results.

This situation echoes past warnings. Two years prior, deputy commander-in-chief Shams al-Din Kabbashi addressed the proliferation of weapons and armed groups, noting the army had begun enacting laws and structures to control "popular resistance" forces. These "popular resistance" elements, comprising semi-autonomous militias, tribal coalitions, and volunteers supporting the SAF, pose a potential future risk if not properly managed and integrated.

The reliance on these disparate armed groups means that even if the RSF is militarily overcome, the underlying issues of armed non-state actors and their political ambitions will persist. This could lead to internal friction within the anti-RSF coalition once the common enemy is diminished, potentially sparking new or renewed localized conflicts.

Unresolved questions remain about the long-term strategy for demobilization, reintegration, and the establishment of a unified national security apparatus. Without addressing these challenges, the potential for a fragmented and protracted conflict across Sudan remains a significant concern for regional stability.